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A CRAIGIAN THEODICY OF HELL 
Charles Seymour 
Problem: if God has middle knowledge, he should actualize a world con-
taining only persons whom he knows would freely choose heaven. Thus 
there should be no hell. Craig offers an answer to this problem in his article 
" 'No Other Name': a Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of 
Salvation Through Christ." Craig is mainly concerned to give a logically 
possible defense of hell, though he thinks his suggestion does not lack the 
sort of plausibility needed for a theodicy. I consider various objections to the 
latter assessment. My conclusion is that, although Craig's argument is 
implausible as a theodicy of conservative exclusivist soteriology, it is useful 
for less traditional ideas of hell. 
One problem with the doctrine of hell is that it seems possible for God, 
being omniscient, to know via middle knowledge those worlds which, 
were he to actualize them, would contain only persons freely accepting sal-
vation. If God is omnipotent it should be possible for him to actualize such 
a world, and he would prefer to do so if he is perfectly good. Thus God 
would not create a world in which some persons reject salvation. Call this 
suggestion "the argument from middle knowledge." 
In his article" 'No Other Name': a Middle Knowledge Perspective on 
the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ," William Lane Craig attempts 
to solve this problem by arguing that there might be no worlds feasible for 
God in which all people are saved. Even if there are, they may be seriously 
deficient in other ways, so that God, while remaining perfectly good, 
would prefer to create some other world in which there are persons who 
choose damnation. Craig's response, to use the common parlance, is a 
defense of hell rather than a theodicy of hell. That is to say, Craig is con-
cerned merely to demonstrate the compossibility of God's existence and 
the existence of the damned; as is the case with Plantinga in the Free Will 
Defense, Craig is committed only to the claim that his solution is logically 
possible, whether or not it is epistemically implausible. 
In the face of any variety of the problem of evil, including the problem 
of hell, I find it hard to feel any interest in a mere defense. It is small com-
fort to realize that there is some logically possible explanation of why God 
allows evil if we believe that this explanation is in fact false. To take the 
Free Will Defense as an example, why should the mere possibility that nat-
ural disasters are instigated by demons help justify the ways of God to 
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man if we believe that demons do not have or exercise this power? Of 
course Plantinga says that he sees nothing unlikely in the possibility of 
malevolent spirits wreaking havoc in the world, but what this claim 
amounts to is that the Free Will Defense can be turned into a Free Will 
Theodicy. Craig, for his part, makes a similar move, saying that although 
his response is presented only as a logically possible defense of hell, it is 
also not implausible. It follows that we should be able to develop a 
Craigian theodicy of hell which appeals only to premises not believed to be 
false or improbable. The purpose of this paper is to attempt such a theodi-
cy by defending Craig's argument against the charge of implausibility. 
Craig's Defense of Hell 
Craig is defending, not just the generic possibility of damnation, but a 
particular view of hell in which those who do not accept Christ are lost. 
Craig believes that "Those who make a well-informed and free decision to 
reject Christ are self-condemned, since they repudiate God's unique sacri-
fice for sin."l This is so because faith in Jesus is "the one means of salvation 
which God has provided."2 However, the problem arises of people who 
have never heard of Christianity. It might seem unfair or mean-spirited to 
damn people for not accepting a doctrine they have never heard of. Craig 
admits that some who have not heard the gospel might be saved by 
responding to "the light of general revelation" that all people possess. But 
this possibility is remote, for "the testimony of Scripture is that the mass of 
humanity do not even respond to the light that they do have."3 How can a 
loving God condemn those who sin against the light yet have not heard of 
the means of salvation? Craig's solution to this particular problem sheds 
some light on the argument from middle knowledge. 
Granting that God has middle knowledge, among the cmmterfac-
tuals of creaturely freedom that God knows are truths about what various 
people would freely do when confronted with the Christian message, for 
instance: "If Chuang Tzu had heard the gospel, he would have freely 
accepted Christ." Craig solves the problem of those who have never heard 
of Christ by supposing that they all would have rejected Christ had they 
heard of him. More exactly, for any person A who dies without hearing of 
Christ, there are no circumstances C such that "If C were the case, then A 
would have freely accepted Christ." No matter how appealingly the 
gospel were presented to her, she would reject it. These souls exhibit what 
Craig calls "transworld damnation, which is possessed by any person who 
freely does not respond to God's grace and so is lost in every world feasi-
ble for God in which that person exists."" Craig's contention is that God is 
neither unjust or cruel in condemning people to hell who have not heard of 
Jesus, if they would have rejected Jesus had they heard the gospel. 
Why does God create such people? Why does he not create only 
people who freely accept Jesus? This question is at the heart of the argu-
ment from middle knowledge. Craig answers that if God were to refrain 
from creating all those who are damned in our world, then circumstances 
would have been very different, which means that some of those who 
accepted Jesus in our world might then reject him. Let C be the total set of 
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circumstances of our world, a world in which there are some who accept 
Christ and some who reject him. The argument from middle knowledge 
proposes that God could have refrained from creating all those souls who 
reject Jesus in C. But this would mean that a different world would have 
existed, whose total set of circumstances we can call C*. Now the argu-
ment assumes that all those who accepted Jesus in C would accept Jesus if 
C* were the case. But, says Craig, this assumption is baseless. It is epis-
temically possible that in C* some who were Christians in C would not be. 
Further, it may be that there is no total set of circumstances God could cre-
ate in which everyone would freely accept the gospel. For all we know, 
then, God faces the choice of either creating a world in which some are 
damned, or not creating free beings at all. Surely, says Craig, God should 
not refrain from creating a world simply because some souls would stub-
bornly refuse God's grace. 
In summary, Craig argues that the counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom may be such that God cannot create a world in which everyone is 
saved. It is not unloving, then, for God to create a world including people 
he foresees choosing damnation, if doing so is necessary for creating a 
world including people who choose salvation. This is particularly true if 
we suppose, as is entirely possible, that those who choose damnation 
would do so in any world in which they existed. 
Everything Craig says is logically possible; and since he sees his 
task as showing how it is possible that God's goodness and hell co-exist, 
Craig can be satisfied with a logically possible response to the problem of 
foreknowledge. But as was said in the introduction, my goal is to provide 
a solution to the problem of hell which is not only possible but not implau-
sible. Although it is not his primary concern, Craig feels his solution does 
not lack plausibility.s Is he right? 
First Objection 
We will consider four objections. The first two concentrate on Craig's 
claim that God might not be able to create a world containing only 
Christians. A closer look at the nature of counterfactuals of creaturely free-
dom will reveal our first objection. Craig is right in supposing that differ-
ent circumstances may result in different actions on the part of free beings. 
But not all differences make a difference. First, the circumstances must be 
in some way noticeably different to the person acting in order for them to 
make a difference in the person's action. A person will act the same way in 
circumstances which to him appear exactly identical.6 
This fact alone does not tell against Craig. For the difference between a 
world filled with those who accept Christ, and a world in which there are 
many who do not, is a difference which is noticeable. But we must make a 
further qualification, for not all noticeable differences make a difference in 
action. I will notice if I have ten trees or eleven in my front yard; but the 
difference will not influence my career decisions. For circumstances to 
make a difference in my actions, they must affect the motives which influ-
ence me. We might think of a way in which the number of trees in my 
yard would affect my career choices: perhaps the additional tree is placed 
106 Faith and Philosophy 
in such a way that it adds greatly to the beauty of my home, making me 
more willing to remain living in it, and thus more willing to remain at my 
job. But there are clearly noticeable differences which are irrelevant to cer-
tain decisions. An additional tree which neither adds to nor detracts from 
the attractiveness of my lawn, which neither adds to or subtracts from the 
property value of my home, in short, which has no other effect than its 
mere presence, is not going to influence my decision to seek a new job. 
For Craig's argument to be more than merely possible, he must explain 
how God's refraining from creating certain persons who reject Christ 
makes a difference in other people's decision to accept Christ. Craig says 
that if God were not to create those who reject Christ in this world, this 
change in circumstances could lead to others rejecting Christ who accepted 
him in this world. We must ask why this makes a difference. 
Perhaps the damned function as examples for others to learn from. 
Sadly, a negative example is the only stimulus strong enough to restrain 
some people from self-destructive behavior. With respect to drug abuse, 
for instance, some people find the idea of chemically induced ecstasy 
inherently distasteful, degrading to rational beings, an obstacle to the more 
lasting though less intense pleasures of love, work, or religion. In the eyes 
of others, however, there is a glamorous appeal to drug abuse that will 
only be dispelled by their witnessing first hand or through reliable testimo-
ny the desolation brought about by addiction. 
The case of accepting Christ is less dramatic but essentially similar. 
Some are attracted to Christianity because of its intrinsic worth: they are 
drawn by the intellectual power of a Christian world-view, or the nobility 
of Jesus as portrayed in the New Testament, for example. But there are 
those who will only convert to Christ by comparing the lives of those who 
accept Christ favorably to those who reject Christ, finding in the former a 
love and peace which is generally lacking in the latter. In a more spectacu-
lar way, the massive evils inflicted by societies founded on the rejection of 
Christ (the Third Reich, Soviet Russia, Mao's China) serve as signs hard to 
ignore for even the habitually indifferent. 
Of course not all non-Christians are unhappy or immoral, just as not all 
drug users are addicts. For the above response to work, we need not 
assume that all Christians are saints and all non-Christians are villains. But 
we must at least assume that those who accept Christ have an advantage 
over those who reject him. Is this assumption implausible? I do not think 
so. In any event, it is part and parcel of Christian teaching: "By their fruits 
you shall know them." If the claim is false, Christianity is false and we 
need not bother justifying hell to begin with. 
Even granting that Christianity gives its adherents a real advantage in 
living a visibly better life, there is the problem of non-Christians who are to 
all appearances saintly and so would not serve as negative examples 
encouraging others to convert to Christ. Since Craig thinks all non-
Christians are damned, then the above explanation would be in his view 
incomplete. Perhaps Hitler or Stalin were created as object lessons, but 
what about, say, Gandhi? 
Less conservative readers will not take offense if I allow the possibility 
that Gandhi is not damned. Certainly he rejected Christianity, but at some 
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less conscious level he may not have rejected Christ. Craig will part com-
pany with me at this point, since he believes that explicit faith in Christ is 
necessary for salvation. But as I will argue shortly, the fact of heathen 
sanctity makes Craig's Christian exclusivity implausible. In defending a 
broadly Craigian theodicy of hell, then, I do not intend to endorse all the 
details of Craig's own position. 
Another objection to my argument would point out that a permanent 
rejection of Christ is not necessary for the sake of motivating conversions in 
others; a merely temporary rejection of Christ can serve equally well. 
Suppose that Hitler's atrocities lead Karl Stein to convert to Christianity in 
1943. Presumably Stein's new-found faith would not be shaken if Hitler 
converted in 1944; in fact, it would be confirmed. To take the analogy with 
drug use farther, one need not be a permanent addict in order to show to 
others the horrors of drug abuse. The visible improvement that results 
from shaking an addiction is an additional inducement for others to avoid 
drugs. Seeing Hitler convert and become a better person would be at least 
as strong a motivation to conversion as seeing Hitler unrepentant, mon-
strous, and miserable to the end of his days. If negative examples are nec-
essary for Stein to repent, then shouldn't God have created in place of 
Hitler a person who would reject Christ until Stein accepts Christ, but who 
would also accept Christ at a later timeT 
Indeed God would prefer to create the merely temporary rebel if he 
could. But given libertarian freedom, we have no assurance that this is fea-
sible for God. For instance, there is no reason to suppose that there is 
someone God could have created in the place of Hitler who would have 
both (1) freely lived a life blatantly vicious enough to prompt Stein's con-
version, and (2) freely accepted Christ at some time after Stein's conver-
sion. It is possible-and, as required for theodicy, not obviously unlike-
ly-that anyone fulfilling (1) would fail to meet (2). 
There remains one problem. I admitted that some people accept Christ 
for reasons that are internal to Christianity itself. C. S. Lewis, for instance, 
found Christianity to be logically inescapable: his autobiography Surprised 
by Joy portrays his conversion as a largely philosophical process. In The 
Seven Storey Mountain Thomas Merton emphasizes the emotional and aes-
thetic appeals of Roman Catholicism which led him to convert. It is proba-
ble, it could be argued, that Lewis, Merton, and others like them would 
have accepted Christ even in a world in which everyone else did, a world 
in which there were no reprobates living notorious lives to highlight by 
contrast the benefits of Christianity. It seems God should have populated 
the world only with Christians like Lewis who, if not transworldly saved, 
at least make a decision to convert which does not hinge on the existence of 
the lost. If this is feasible, then God need not create the damned in order 
to create some who are saved. 
We need not wonder how a Craigian theodicy of hell would deal with 
this argument; Craig has already given a response. As he puts it: 
Suppose that the only worlds feasible for God in which all persons 
receive Christ and are saved are worlds containing only a handful of 
persons. Is it not at least possible that such a world is less preferable 
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to God than a world in which great multitudes come to experience 
His salvation and a few are damned because they freely reject Christ? 
Not only does this seem to me possibly true, but I think that it proba-
bly is true. Why should the joy and blessedness of those who would 
receive God's grace and love be prevented on account of those who 
would freely spurn it?8 
50 even if God could create a world in which there are only people who 
accept Christ, God is justified in creating worlds with damned people, as 
long as this is necessary for creating a much larger number of the saved. 
Perhaps people like Lewis or Merton are rare. God should create more 
people, some of whom damn themselves quite willingly, for the sake of 
receiving many more people who will experience eternal joy. 
In sum, then, Craig can answer our first objection by saying that the 
existence of those who choose damnation does have an influence on other 
persons' decision to accept salvation. Even if it were possible for God to 
create only people who would accept Christ regardless of other people's 
spiritual state, it is not implausible to suppose that the number of such peo-
ple is so small as to make such a world much worse than a world in which 
there are some damned but many saved. 
Second Objection 
The second objection, found in Thomas Talbott's response to Craig, is 
also based on the belief that only noticeable differences can make a differ-
ence in action:' Craig had argued that a world in which the damned do not 
exist is noticeably different than our world, and different in a way that is 
relevant to the salvation of those who do accept Christ. Talbott accepts this 
for the sake of argument. 5till, he continues, there is no noticeable differ-
ence, to any given person 5, between a world in fact peopled with the 
saved and the damned, and a dream-world which appears to 5 exactly the 
same way. As long as 5 is not aware of this fact, he cannot be affected by it. 
Thus, Talbott concludes, God can make sure all are saved. If 5 for some 
reason will only accept Christ in a world that contains non-Christians, then 
God can create 5 as a brain-in-the-vat, programmed to receive impressions 
of people who reject Christ. 
This objection is stronger than the first, but it is not beyond reproach. In 
his article "Talbott's Universalism Once More" Craig questions both the 
logical validity and the ethical basis of Talbott's argument. I will defend 
Talbott against the charge of invalidity, but I agree with Craig that ethical 
considerations make Talbott's suggestion implausible. 
To show its invalidity, Craig casts the argument in symbolic form and 
shows how the premises do not imply the desired conclusion. It will be 
easiest to simply reproduce Craig's discussion here. 
Talbott argues that if in Cl 5 would be freely saved and in C2 5' 
would be freely saved, then in C3 5 and 5' would be freely saved. 
[C3 is the circumstance of 5 and 5' obtaining the appearances of Cl 
and C2, respectively.] Let, then, Cn = 'Circumstancesn obtain', Sn = 
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'5n will freely accept salvation', and ACn = The appearance of Cn 
obtains'. In order to avoid the fallacy of strengthening the 
antecedent, Talbott infers from 
that 
He justifies this inference by supposing that 
(9) (AC1 • AC2) = C3. 
We thus infer (8) from 
(10) (ACI • AC2) ~ 51 • 52· 
But how do we know that (10) is true? The answer is that to 51, Cl 
and ACI are indistinguishable; similarly for 52 and C2 and AC2. 50 
we may affirm 
(11) (Cl ~ 51)::J (ACI ~ 51), 
(12) (C2 ~ 52) ::J (AC2 ~ 52)· 
From (6), (11) and (7), (12), it follows that 
(13) (AC1 ~ 51), 
(14) (AC2 ~ 52). 
But how do we move from (13), (14), to (1O)? The answer seems to 
be: by strengthening the antecedent of (13) or (14), which is logically 
invalid. Hence, the argument for (8) is unsound.lO 
Problems of precision arise at the very outset. First, Craig uses the notation 
5n equivocally; at one moment it refers to a person 5n, the next to the state 
of affairs consisting in 5n 's accepting salvation. For the sake of accuracy, 
then, I will let 5n refer to the state of affairs of a person accepting salvation, 
and 5n will refer to persons themselves. Another ambiguity is that when 
Craig lets ACn = "The appearance of Cn obtains", he does not stipulate to 
whom the appearance obtains. Does ACI means that 5t, or 52, or everyone 
experiences the appearance of Cl? Thus we need to be more precise. Let us 
assume in the following that AnCn = "The appearance of Cn obtains to 5n." 
The crucial premises are (11) and (12). The principle underlying these 
propositions is Talbott's claim that if two circumstances are indistinguish-
able to a person 5, then 5 will perform the same action in both circum-
stances. The problem with Craig's critique is that it underestimates the 
force of this principle. When applied consistently, it in fact leads to the 
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conclusion that Talbott wishes to draw. 
Craig correctly notes that since Cl and AlCl are indistinguishable, (11) 
is true. It is also true that (11), even when combined with its counterpart 
(12), does not lead to (8). However, Cl and AlCl' and C2 and A2C2, are 
not the only pairs of circumstances that are indistinguishable to SI or S2. 
AlCl and the circumstance (AlCl • A2C2) are both indistinguishable to SI 
as well as to S2. Because SI is "hermetically sealed in his own illusory 
world"ll, as Craig puts it, he does not notice whether or not A2C2 
obtains-that is to say, because 9 experiences only his own illusory world, 
he does not know what S2 is experiencing. Likewise with respect to S2 and 
AlCl. On the model of premises (11) and (12) above, we can derive from 
these considerations the following premises. 
These premises allow us to formulate a valid argument for Talbott's 
conclusion. 
by assumption 
(2*) (Cl --7 Sl) ::::l (AlCl --7 Sl) 
guishable to 9 
(3*) AIC1 --7 Sl from (1), (2) by modus ponens 
(4*) (AlCl --7 Sl)::::l [(AlCl • A2C2) --7 Sl] since AlCl and (AlCl • 
A2C2) are indistinguishable to Sl 
In parallel fashion 
by assumption 
(7*) (C2 --7 S2) ::::l (A2C2 --7 S2) since C2 and A2C2 are indistinguish-
able to S' 
(8*) A2C2 --7 S2 from (6*), (7*) by modus ponens 
(9*) (A2C2 --7 S2)::::l [(AlCl • A2C2) --7 S2] since A2C2 and (AlCl • 
A2C2) are indistinguishable to S2 
from (8*), (9*) by modus ponens 
From (5*) and (10*), by a law of counterfactuallogic, we infer that 
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Thus Talbott's argument is not invalid, and the first of Craig's responses 
is nullified. But even if Talbott's logic is faultless, the value judgments on 
which Talbott depends are suspect. As Descartes says, God is not a deceiv-
er. The idea of hell may be intolerable, but it is just as intolerable to think 
that all our friends, our loved ones, our possessions and accomplishments, 
are purely illusory. Craig says, "This constitutes a profound violation of 
human dignity."12 One could respond that temporary deception is prefer-
able to eternal misery.J3 This may be true if God is conceived of as a utili-
tarian maximizer of happiness, but if God is one who instead respects indi-
viduals enough to let them make free choices in the face of reality, then 
Craig's response is cogent. The issue also depends on how one conceives 
of hell. The point is more acute to the extent that hell approximates a sort 
of eternal torture. But milder views are possible in which hell is, though an 
existence of unending unhappiness, not excruciatingly painful to the 
damned. We can even conceive of the damned preferring it to the humility 
involved in submitting to God. So it is not apparent that deceit is better 
than eternal suffering. 
Third Objection 
So far we have limited our discussion to Craig's premise that God may 
not be able to create a world with only the saved. For our third objection, 
let us turn to a different premise; namely, the claim that all those who have 
not heard of Christ suffer from transworld damnation. Consider Mohandas 
Gandhi. Just as Hitler has become the archetype of evil for the twentieth-
century, so Gandhi is our stock example of the virtuous man. Gandhi had 
heard of Christianity but rejected it. It is very probable, however, that if he 
had been born in different circumstances, he would have been a Christian. 
Gandhi exhibited a love of truth and a willingness to follow it that makes it 
likely he would have accepted Christianity if, say, he had understood it bet-
ter (he seems to have gotten his impression of Christianity from some luke-
warm missionaries), or had been born in England rather than India, or had 
been born into a meat-eating family (his vegetarianism led him to rank 
Jesus below Buddha).14 Gandhi's rejection of Christianity seems to have 
been based on innocent error and unavoidable cultural influences, not 
rebellion against God or worldliness. Thus it is likely that, for Gandhi, there 
are circumstances in which he would have accepted Christ. 
Gandhi does not fit Craig's argument exactly, since Craig was dis-
cussing those who had never heard of Christianity. However, the case of 
Gandhi suggests that not all who reject Christ suffer from transworld 
damnation. Thus Craig's solution cannot be total; he cannot justify God's 
damning people like Gandhi. Furthermore, for every good person like 
Gandhi who has heard the gospel and rejected it, there are likely to be 
other equally good people who have not heard the gospel at all. Craig 
does not discuss the case of pre-Christian figures like Socrates or Buddha 
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who seem to have been men of good will; given different circumstances, 
they most likely would have accepted Christ. It also seems likely that in 
those nations largely untouched by the gospel, say medieval India or pre-
sent-day China, there would be many good people who would have been 
Christians had things been different. It's hard to believe that none of them 
would have accepted Christ had they been raised in pious Christian 
homes, for example. In SUill, good people would likely accept God's truth, 
given the ability to hear it, the mind to discern the truth and/ or a clear rev-
elation from God. 
Craig might hold that such people as Gandhi and Socrates are instances 
of those rare individuals who respond to "the light of general revelation" 
and so obtain the benefits of Christ's atoning death without being 
Christian. Unfortunately Craig does not explain what is involved in 
responding to the light of general revelation. Gandhi confesses to various 
moral failings in his autobiography, so it seems that he did not always act 
in accordance with his beliefs. Perhaps by "responding to the light of gen-
eral revelation" Craig means "obeying one's conscience most of the time." 
One might wonder then what percentage of good actions is required to 
qualify as an adequate response to the light, and why someone who falls 
just above this percentage is saved and obtains eternal happiness, whereas 
those who fall below it experience everlasting unhappiness. 
The case of Gandhi and people like him makes it unlikely that all who 
reject Christianity until death exhibit transworld damnation. Still, if one 
allows that good people can be saved without accepting Jesus, or that peo-
ple are given chances after death to accept Christ in more conducive cir-
cumstances, then the concept of transworld damnation remains helpfuL 
After all, the fact that there are some non-Christians such as Gandhi who 
do not exhibit transworld damnation does not prove that there are no non-
Christians who exhibit it. It could be that all those who are damned are 
transworldly damned, even if not all those who reject Christ (at least in this 
life) are damned. 
Still, the definition of transworld damnation needs a bit of fine tuning 
before it can drive a theodicy of hell. Most Christians believe that infants 
can be saved despite the fact that they are obviously incapable of choosing 
Christ. But infant salvation presents a severe problem for the claim that all 
the damned are transworldly damned. Clearly Hitler, if damned, is not 
transworldy damned, since God could have given him a fatal case of 
measles immediately after his baptism. If infants need not be baptized in 
order to be saved, then so much the better; God need not wait for someone 
to baptize Hitler before giving him the measles. 
Craig invites such problems by defining transworld damnation as the 
property "which is possessed by any person who freely does not respond to 
God's grace and so is lost in every world feasible for God in which that 
person exists." ls Clearly, on a conservative evangelical view which restricts 
free choice with respect to salvation to our antemortem existence, no one is 
likely to be transworldly damned; for each person there is a world feasible 
for God in which that person dies before the "age of accountability" and 
hence does not freely fail to respond to God's grace. Similar problems face 
liberal views which allow for the possibility of salvation after death. Yet 
A CRAIGIAN THEODICY OF HELL 113 
Craig could not drop the word "freely" from the definition of transworld 
damnation without creating other difficulties. On the catholic view, bap-
tized infants do not respond to God's grace, yet they are saved; and few 
evangelicals would say that infants go to hell because they did not accept 
Jesus as their savior. 
Craig's transworld damnation is modelled after Plantinga's "transworld 
depravity", which is the property a person has if he would commit a sin in 
any circumstances in which he was created. More accurately, the person 
exhibits transworld depravity if and only if he would commit a sin in any 
circumstances in which he was created free. To make his property of 
transworld damnation a more precise application of Plantingian theodicy 
to the question of hell, Craig needs to define transworld damnation as the 
property which is possessed by any person who freely does not respond to 
God's grace, and so is lost, in every world feasible for God in which that 
person exists free to respond to God's grace or not. By adding this clause, 
Craig could allow that there are worlds in which the transworldly damned 
do not freely fail to respond to God. These worlds, however, are worlds in 
which the damned are not free to respond at all, because of infancy, mental 
disease or defect, etc., and so are not counterexamples to his definition of 
transworld damnation. 
I believe this revision to be Craig's original intent. First, it is closer to 
Plantinga's definition of transworld depravity, and Craig says that 
transworld damnation is analogous to transworld depravity.16 Second, 
Craig developed the notion of transworld damnation in response to those 
who would say that God would not create somebody who chooses damna-
tion if he could create him in circumstances in which he freely chooses salva-
tion. The revised definition of transworld damnation, by asserting that 
there are no feasible worlds in which the damned freely choose salvation, 
is more appropriate to this task. 
What if a proponent of the argument from middle knowledge main-
tained that damnation is such a horrible fate that God would do anything 
feasible in order to prevent someone from experiencing it, even if this 
requires bringing about their death as infants? The problem is that such a 
response places a lower value on free choice than most theodicists are 
wont to do. The problem of hell, like the problem of evil in general, is best 
solved by appealing to free will. Freedom is valuable enough to outweigh 
the evils it sometimes brings about, and this includes the evil of damna-
tion. Of course, depending on our theological views on the fate of dead 
infants and children, we might have to admit that God creates some people 
who are never given a free choice for or against salvation. But recognizing 
the value of free will allows us to say that it is not necessary that God cre-
ate us in worlds in which we are saved, if the only worlds in which we are 
saved are ones in which we never develop free choice. Putting it loosely, 
the damned would have nothing to complain of in being damned since 
they would not have freely chosen salvation in any world in which that 
choice was given them. 
We are still confronted with the example of Gandhi and others who are 
not likely to be transworldly damned even on the revised definition. It is 
very likely that in some feasible world in which Gandhi is free to decide, he 
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accepts Christ. So even the revised formulation of transworld damnation 
cannot help us formulate a theodicy of conservative versions of hell. But 
liberal views of hell will not insist on Gandhi being damned, as they could 
admit the likelihood of Gandhi accepting Christ in the afterlife. All a 
Craigian liberal need say is that anyone who freely refuses salvation even 
after death would not accept salvation in any world in which he was creat-
ed free to choose salvation. Since we can't see what people choose after 
death, such a claim is not (in this life) open to refutation. 
In sum, it is unlikely that all non-Christians are transworldly damned, 
and so it is difficult to defend Craig's variety of conservative evangelical 
soteriology. However, his notion of transworld damnation remains help-
ful in defending liberal versions of hell. On these versions it is not implau-
sible to suppose that the damned choose damnation in every world in 
which they are created free to choose. It is not cruel for God to let these 
people be damned. 
Fourth Objection 
But is it morally acceptable that they be created in the first place? This 
question underlies the fourth and final objection to Craig. Suppose that 
Craig is right and God can create people who choose heaven only by creat-
ing other people who choose hell. Would it not be cruel of God to do so? 
According to Marilyn Adams' definition, "God is good" means God 
ensures that every person's life is on the whole a great good.17 The lives of 
the damned are not on the whole good; indeed, every moment of their 
postmortem existence is on the whole bad. Thus God cannot create any-
one who is damned, even if this means God cannot create any free beings 
in heaven either. 
Craig is rightly skeptical about the moral principle appealed to here. He 
asks, "Why should the joy and blessedness of those who would receive 
God's grace and love be prevented on acount of those who would freely 
spurn it?"l' Later he says that the "previsioned obduracy [of the damned] 
should not be allowed to preclude God's creating persons who would freely 
respond to His grace and be saved."19 It would be tragic for the freely cho-
sen rebellion of some souls to prevent the creation of other souls who will 
accept everlasting happiness; as C. S. Lewis puts it in The Great Divorce, we 
would not want a world in which "misery can hold joy up for ransom."20 
Conclusion 
So the problem of middle knowledge is defused. It is epistemically pos-
sible, as Craig says, that no matter what situation God created, some 
would refuse him; and it is not unloving, indeed it shows a love and 
respect for the autonomy of the person, for God to create some who damn 
themselves in any and all situations in which they are given the choice, if 
this is necessary for others to attain salvation. 
There are other arguments against the doctrine of hell besides the one 
from middle knowledge. There is the problem of the apparent injustice of 
inflicting eternal punishment for finite Stl.s, the question of whether the 
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blessed in heaven, and God himself, can be happy given the existence of 
the darrmed, etc. So in defending Craig's response to the argument from 
middle knowledge I have not developed a complete theodicy of hell. 
Indeed, I doubt that Craig's article will be helpful in answering these other 
arguments-nor was it intended to be. But as he gives us the most effec-
tive response to the argument from middle knowledge to date, any fin-
ished theodicy of hell will be to that extent Craigian.2J 
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